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ABSTRACT
How well do people share risk? Standard risk-sharing regressions assume that any variation in
households’ risk preferences is uncorrelated with variation in the cyclicality of income. I combine
administrative and survey data to show that this assumption is questionable: Risk-tolerant workers
hold jobs where earnings carry more aggregate risk. The correlation makes risk-sharing regressions
in the previous literature too pessimistic. I derive techniques that eliminate the bias, apply them
to U.S. data, and ﬁnd that the eﬀect of idiosyncratic income shocks on consumption is practically
small and statistically diﬃcult to distinguish from zero.
Keywords: Risk sharing; Risk preferences; Heterogeneity; Imperfect insurance
JEL classiﬁcation: E21, E24
∗Email: wohls@minneapolisfed.org. I thank Pierre-André Chiappori, James Heckman, Robert Shimer, and
especially Robert Townsend for many invaluable discussions. Numerous colleagues, seminar participants,
and the editor and referees of the Journal of Political Economy also made many helpful suggestions. The
University of Chicago, the National Institute on Aging, and the Chicago Center of Excellence in Health
Promotion Economics provided generous ﬁnancial support during my work on initial drafts of this paper.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
A large literature starting with Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), and Townsend (1994)
tests whether households are insured against idiosyncratic 
uctuations in income by running
regressions of the form
logcit = dt + glogXit + 
equal
it ; (1)
where logcit and logXit are household consumption and income growth and dt is a
time indicator variable representing aggregate shocks. Under full risk sharing, consumption
should not respond to idiosyncratic shocks after controlling for aggregate shocks, so g should
be zero. In practice, however, g is almost always positive and statistically signicant.1
This paper shows that heterogeneity in risk preferences will bias the test in (1) against
the null hypothesis of full insurance. When some households are less risk averse than others,
a Pareto-ecient consumption allocation puts more aggregate consumption risk on those who
are less risk averse. Therefore, under heterogeneity in risk aversion, (1) should be written as
logcit = bidt + glogXit + it; (2)
where bi is decreasing in i's risk aversion. Hence, the error term in (1) can be written as

equal
it = it + (bi   1)dt: (3)
Since dt represents aggregate shocks, income growth logXit will be positively correlated
with the error term 
equal
it in the standard regression (1) if less-risk-averse households' in-
comes move more strongly with aggregate shocks. Such a correlation will bias upward the
estimated g in (1). In other words, if less-risk-averse households have more procyclical in-
comes, the standard regression will overestimate the correlation between idiosyncratic income
and consumption and can spuriously reject the null of full insurance when insurance is actually
1Full insurance has been rejected in data from the United States (Attanasio and Davis 1996; Cochrane
1991; Dynarski and Gruber 1997; Hayashi et al. 1996), C^ ote d'Ivoire (Deaton 1997), India (Munshi and
Rosenzweig 2009; Townsend 1994), Nigeria (Udry 1994), and Thailand (Townsend 1995). Mace (1991) does
not reject eciency in U.S. data, but Nelson (1994) overturns this result.perfect. Section 2 formally derives this bias within a model of full insurance.
There are many reasons to expect that less-risk-averse households will have more
procyclical incomes. If insurance is imperfect, workers will face a risk-return trade-o, and
those who are more risk tolerant will choose jobs that carry more risk, both idiosyncratic
and aggregate. Even under full insurance, risk preferences could be correlated with income
risk | for example, if preferences for smoothing labor supply are correlated with preferences
for smoothing consumption. Of course, other factors such as skills also aect job choices, so
the relationship between risk preferences and income risk is ultimately an empirical question.
In section 3, I provide suggestive evidence that less-risk-averse people have more procyclical
incomes. I classify respondents to the Health and Retirement Study according to how they
answer a hypothetical question about taking risky jobs. Earnings are more volatile and more
correlated with aggregate consumption for men who report that they are less risk averse.
The rest of the paper measures the relationship between idiosyncratic income shocks
and consumption while accounting for the relationship between risk preferences and income
processes. Section 4 derives econometric methods for testing the null hypothesis of full insur-
ance. I focus on short panels and treat households' preferences as nuisance parameters that
must be eliminated from the equation. Section 5 extends the tests to allow estimates of the
extent of partial insurance if full insurance is rejected. My approach is to interpret standard
risk-sharing regressions as structural estimates of a simple model of imperfect insurance, in
which households trade in complete markets but transferring resources between households
is costly. The coecient on income then measures the relative costs and benets of risk
sharing; the eect is large if transferring resources is very costly or households are not very
risk averse. Section 6 applies these methods to income and consumption data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics. Holding aggregate shocks constant, household consumption rises
with income, but accounting for heterogeneity reduces the eect by one-fourth to one-half.
The eect is small and, in many specications, statistically indistinguishable from zero. I
reject the hypothesis that common-preferences regressions are correctly specied.
This paper is related to literatures on the relationship between preferences and in-
come processes and on risk sharing with heterogeneous preferences. Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jrgensen (2002) show that entrepreneurs' incomes are highly correlated with the public
2equities market and hence highly procyclical; they also infer from portfolio choices that en-
trepreneurs may be more risk tolerant than nonentrepreneurs, but they do not have direct
measures of preferences. Bonin et al. (2007) show that more-risk-averse people hold jobs
with less idiosyncratic risk but do not analyze aggregate risk. Guiso et al. (2002) nd that
more-risk-averse people have riskier self-reported subjective earnings expectations. Fuchs-
Sch undeln and Sch undeln (2005) measure precautionary savings while accounting for the
endogeneity of income risk. Dynarski and Gruber (1997) test for full insurance while al-
lowing heterogeneity in time preference but not in risk preference. Townsend (1994) allows
heterogeneous risk preferences in part of his seminal paper on testing for full insurance, but he
employs a short panel and runs a separate regression for each household, so hypotheses can be
tested only by assuming a parametric distribution for the regression error. Kurosaki (2001)
makes a similar analysis. Dubois (2001) tests for full insurance while allowing risk aversion to
vary with observed household characteristics but rules out unobserved heterogeneity. Finally,
in a closely related paper, Mazzocco and Saini (forthcoming) test for full insurance with
heterogeneous preferences in data from rural India. Their dataset has more than 100 ob-
servations per household, which allows them to avoid functional form assumptions; estimate
each household's preferences, rather than treat preferences as nuisance parameters; and test
for heterogeneity in preferences. However, they do not estimate a model of partial insurance
and so cannot say how economically important a rejection of full insurance is. They also do
not test whether income processes are correlated with independently measured preferences.
Further, their methods do not apply to short panels and thus cannot be used to study risk
sharing using available household-level data from the United States.2
2. Heterogeneity Bias in Risk-Sharing Tests
Diamond (1967) and Wilson (1968) show that a Pareto-ecient consumption allocation
depends only on aggregate shocks and not at all on idiosyncratic shocks, with more risk-
tolerant households bearing a larger share of the aggregate risk. This section shows that
when preferences vary, standard tests of full insurance do not capture the true Pareto-ecient
2Mazzocco and Saini (forthcoming) suggest applying their methods to long panels of synthetic cohorts, but
synthetic cohorts would average out all within-cohort heterogeneity, reducing the need to allow heterogeneity.
3allocation and thus may generate spurious rejections of full insurance.
Assume that households' preferences depend only on a single consumption good, c. At
each date t, denote the state of the economy by st. Household i's preferences over consumption










where the coecient of relative risk aversion 
i > 0 varies across households.3
The optimal allocation can be decentralized, but it is convenient to study a social
planner's problem. Let Ct(st) be the aggregate consumption available in the economy at date
t in state st. (If storage is possible, then Ct is net of aggregate storage.) Given Pareto weights















subject to the constraint that, for each date and state, the total of households' consumptions
is no larger than the aggregate available consumption:
X
i
cit(st)  Ct(st) 8 t;st: (6)
Assume an interior solution and let t Pr(st)t(st) be the Lagrange multiplier on the aggre-






i = t(st): (7)
The crucial implication of (7) is the familiar fact that, under full insurance, a household's
consumption depends only on the aggregate shock t(st); conditional on the aggregate shock,
3Heterogeneity in 
i can represent dierences in utility functions or dierences in relative risk aversion
among households with identical non-CRRA preferences but dierent consumption levels. Schulhofer-Wohl
(2007) shows that CRRA preferences can locally approximate any smooth, concave utility function.
4idiosyncratic variables such as the household's income do not aect its consumption at all.
To bring the model to data, assume that consumption is measured with multiplicative
error: Observed consumption is cit = eitc









( logt) + it: (8)
Equation (8) says aggregate shocks t have a larger eect on households that have smaller
coecients of relative risk aversion 
i. Household income does not enter the equation at all,









( logt) + g logXit + it; (9)
and then estimating the coecient on income g and testing the hypothesis that g = 0.
Almost all previous analyses of risk sharing have not estimated equation (9), however.
The studies note that with identical risk preferences | 
i = 









( logt) + g logXit + 
equal
it ; (10)
which is simpler than (9) because (1=
)( logt) is just a time dummy variable.4
The central point of this paper is that omitted variable bias makes the estimated
coecient on income in (10) too large. If the true model is (9) but a researcher mistakenly





)( logt) + it: (11)
The least squares estimator of the coecient on income in equation (10) is unbiased if
Cov(logXit;
equal
it ) = 0, biased upward if Cov(logXit;
equal
it ) > 0, and biased downward if
Cov(logXit;
equal
it ) < 0. Suppose that income depends on common and idiosyncratic shocks:
logXit = qimt + uit, where mt is a common shock, qi is the semielasticity of household i's
income to the common shock, and uit is an idiosyncratic shock to i's income. For simplicity,
4The household xed eect logi=
i in (10) is often removed by rst-dierencing the data to obtain (1).
5assume the distributions of qi and 





























Aggregate income and aggregate consumption are likely to be positively correlated. Because
t is the multiplier on the aggregate resource constraint, it is decreasing in aggregate con-
sumption. Therefore, Cov[mt;logt] < 0. Hence (12) is positive, and the income coecient
in (10) is biased upward, if Cov[qi;1=
i] > 0. That is, the income coecient in (10) is biased
upward if income responds more strongly to aggregate shocks for less-risk-averse households.
A similar bias arises if households have heterogeneous time preferences. If i is the














That is, with heterogeneity in time preference, consumption rises faster for households with





i must be included in the risk-sharing regression to obtain a valid
test of full insurance. If they are omitted, as in (10), the estimated coecient on income will
be biased upward if income rises more quickly for more patient households.
Other than the Dubois (2001) and Mazzocco and Saini (forthcoming) papers on het-
erogeneity and risk sharing described in the introduction, previous studies have addressed the
possible bias by nding assumptions under which it does not arise. For example, Cochrane
(1991) tests how households smooth shocks other than income that he argues are uncorrelated
with preferences, while Ogaki and Zhang (2001) allow decreasing relative risk aversion, so
relative risk aversion depends on the level of consumption but nothing else. My approach is
dierent. In the next section, I present suggestive evidence that risk preferences are correlated
with income processes even after controlling for observed characteristics. Then, in section 4,
I derive estimators that eliminate the resulting bias in risk-sharing tests. My estimators also
remove the potential bias from heterogeneity in time preferences.
63. Occupation Choice and Risk Preferences
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a panel survey of more than 22,000 Ameri-
cans born in 1923 to 1947, contains both lifetime earnings histories and experimental questions
that give evidence on respondents' preferences. These data permit a direct test of the hy-
pothesis that incomes are more strongly correlated with aggregate shocks for less-risk-averse
workers | a crucial test because this hypothesis underpins my argument that standard risk-
sharing tests are biased. On entering the study, each HRS respondent is asked the following:
Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family, and you have a good job
guaranteed to give you your current (family) income every year for life. You are
given the opportunity to take a new and equally good job, with a 50-50 chance it
will double your (family) income and a 50-50 chance that it will cut your (family)
income by a third. Would you take the new job?5
Depending on how they answer, respondents are then asked about jobs that give a fty-fty
chance of doubling income or of cutting it by 20 percent or 50 percent.6 The majority reject
even the job that might cut income by 20 percent, and I classify them as having low risk
tolerance. I classify those who accept any risky job as having high risk tolerance. Respondents
answered the question in 1992 or 1998, when they were 51 to 75 years old. Barsky et al. (1997)
establish that HRS respondents who say they would take risky hypothetical jobs take more
risks on many real-world dimensions but do not examine income processes.
The HRS includes restricted-access Social Security records of each respondent's annual
earnings in jobs and self-employment from 1951 to 1991 or 1997, depending on when the
respondent entered the sample. Through 1979, earnings are top-coded at the Social Security
taxable earnings maximum; 30 to 60 percent of observations on prime-age male workers
are censored each year. The pre-1980 data also omit jobs not covered by Social Security,
including, in some years, most government jobs. Starting in 1980, the data come from W-2
tax forms, which include jobs not covered by Social Security and are top-coded at higher
levels but omit self-employment earnings.7 I de
ate earnings by the Consumer Price Index.
5To avoid status-quo bias, the question in some years species that the respondent must leave the current
job and choose between two new jobs, one with a safe income and the other with a risky income.
6Some respondents are also asked about jobs that might cut income by 10 percent or 75 percent.
7The Web appendix shows that results using Social Security earnings for all years are largely similar.
7I restrict my analysis to men ages 23 to 61, since women in the HRS cohorts and older
and younger men are less likely to work full time. I drop respondents who did not answer
risk-tolerance questions or did not release Social Security records, as well as observations with
zero earnings. I assume observations with missing or zero earnings are missing at random.8
I also drop men who have fewer than ve uncensored earnings observations, because some
empirical models I consider are not always identied in such cases. With these restrictions,
I have 115,424 annual observations for 4,090 men, of whom 62 percent fall in the low-risk-
tolerance group. Appendix A1 gives summary statistics.
Because earnings are top-coded, I measure the relationship between earnings and ag-
gregate shocks in a regression framework, where I can account for censoring with a tobit
model. The specication I estimate is
log(earningsit) = 0i + 1j log(PCEt) + x
0
itj + ijt; (14)
where PCEt is real, per capita aggregate personal consumption expenditures from the Na-
tional Income and Product Accounts; j = low, high indexes risk-tolerance groups; 0i is an
individual random eect; and xit is a vector of time-invariant and time-varying controls: ed-
ucation, experience, experience squared, and indicator variables for workers who are white,
immigrants, and veterans. I include a quadratic time trend in the controls to account for
common trends in aggregate consumption and earnings.
I interpret (14) as an equation that a worker could use to predict his lifetime earnings
prole. The coecient on aggregate consumption shows how income varies with aggregate
shocks. The experience and trend coecients re
ect how income would vary over time if there
were no aggregate shocks. The variance of the error term measures idiosyncratic 
uctuations
in the worker's earnings. Equation (14) is an admittedly simplistic specication for earnings
dynamics, but with top-coded data, I cannot take rst dierences to compute innovations to
income. Also, my goal is only to study the correlation between earnings and aggregate shocks,
not to estimate a fully specied model of individual earnings. In the Web appendix, I use data
8Treating zeros as censored low values would be inappropriate because | given that prime-age male
workers are unlikely to remain unemployed for an entire calendar year | many zeros are likely to be for
people who held jobs not covered by Social Security.
8from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, where top-coding is minimal but risk-preference
data are lacking, to show that regressions in dierences would likely produce similar results.9
The Web appendix also shows that treating the individual-specic intercept as a xed eect
and allowing dierent coecients on the regressors for each worker produces qualitatively
similar results, though with larger standard errors.
The tobit model assumes the error term is normally distributed and has constant
variance over time for each worker. I allow the error term to be correlated across workers
within a risk-tolerance group in each year. I employ the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo
method to estimate the posterior distribution of the parameters. The Web appendix gives
details.
The top panel of table 1 shows the results. A 1 percent change in aggregate per-
sonal consumption raises earnings by 0.1 percentage point more for workers in the high-risk-
tolerance group than for workers in the low-risk-tolerance group.10 It is unclear whether log
aggregate personal consumption is the correct aggregate variable to include in this regression
| in principle, we should use the multiplier on the aggregate resource constraint, but the
multiplier is unobservable | so as a robustness check, I repeat the regression with other ag-
gregate variables. The dierence between the risk-tolerance groups is somewhat larger when
I use GDP or aggregate wages and salaries in place of personal consumption. For GDP and
aggregate wages and salaries, the dierence is statistically signicant at the 5 percent level,
if we interpret Bayesian posterior density intervals as frequentist condence intervals. For
9Although the PSID asked risk-tolerance questions in 1996, most people who answered the questions have
too few years of data to precisely estimate the relationship between their earnings and aggregate shocks. The
sample size can be increased | though not to nearly the size of the HRS sample | by examining family
income and assuming each family has the risk tolerance of that family's respondent in 1996. In addition,
examining family income parallels my use of family income as the idiosyncratic shock in my risk-sharing
tests later in the paper. The Web appendix shows that the elasticity of family income to aggregate personal
consumption and GDP is higher for families with higher risk tolerance, but the dierence is not statistically
signicant because the standard errors are quite large, and the dierence disappears when aggregate wages
and salaries are used to measure aggregate shocks.
10For both groups, the elasticity is surprisingly high, given that the elasticity of aggregate earnings to
aggregate consumption has to be near one unless labor income is highly procyclical. Aggregation eects may
explain this result: If earnings are more procyclical for low-income workers (Solon et al. 1994), the average
elasticity of income to aggregate variables when we weight workers equally can exceed one even though the
average elasticity, weighting by income, must be near one. Top-coding prevents me from computing HRS
workers' permanent incomes and reweighting to test this hypothesis. Reweighting is possible in the PSID data
in the Web appendix and shows that the coecient is statistically indistinguishable from one when workers
are weighted by permanent income.
9all three aggregate variables, the variance of idiosyncratic errors is also higher for workers in
the high-risk-tolerance group. In other words, although the estimates are imprecise, the data
provide suggestive evidence that high-risk-tolerance workers bear both more aggregate risk
and more idiosyncratic risk.
The more-risk-tolerant group includes more immigrants and has, on average, more
education. To rule out the possibility that these dierences in characteristics mean the more-
risk-tolerant men never had the opportunity to take less risky jobs, in the bottom panel
of table 1 I repeat the regressions on a sample restricted to white, native-born men with
exactly 12 years of education (the largest race-by-education cell in the sample). Restricting
the sample reduces the precision of the results but does not change the pattern of point
estimates: Earnings vary more with aggregate shocks for more risk-tolerant men.
The results support the idea that people share aggregate risk by sorting into jobs
according to risk preferences, with several caveats. Most important, because HRS respondents
are interviewed late in life, people who express more risk tolerance may do so precisely
because they experienced volatile incomes and learned to tolerate 
uctuations. Even then,
however, the results show that risk tolerance is correlated with the aggregate income risk a
person faces | and this correlation, not any particular direction of causality, is all that is
needed to bias the results of risk-sharing regressions that assume common preferences. In
addition, dierences in reported risk tolerance may re
ect something other than dierences in
preferences. For example, holding preferences constant, people who have low assets may be
less willing to take risky jobs because they cannot self-insure. If people who have low assets
also have less-cyclical labor income, I would nd that people who report lower risk tolerance
hold safer jobs, without any heterogeneity in preferences. However, Solon et al. (1994) nd
that low-income workers have more-procyclical incomes, so accounting for the eect of assets
on reported preferences would likely increase the measured dierences in earnings risk. Other
characteristics such as age and household composition or xed obligations such as mortgages
could also aect respondents' willingness to accept risky jobs. This eect could bias my
results if the relevant characteristics are systematically related to the time-series correlation
of an individual's income with aggregate shocks, as might happen if, say, married men are
more likely than never-married men (with the same underlying preferences) to take low-risk
10jobs. Otherwise, though, this eect would simply add noise to the measure of preferences
and would, if anything, make it more dicult to nd a dierence between the risk-tolerance
groups.
Measurement problems are also a concern. Earnings recorded by Social Security will
spuriously move with GDP if workers shift during recessions from covered to uncovered jobs
or if underreporting of self-employment income varies with the business cycle. Also, I do
not correct for noise in the risk tolerance variable, but unless workers are more likely to be
classied incorrectly than to be classied correctly | that is, if true risk tolerance is higher
in the group that I classify as having low risk tolerance | misclassication implies that the
true dierence between the groups is larger than the estimated dierence (Aigner 1973).
Finally, nonrandom sample selection could aect the results. Because HRS respondents
are surveyed late in life, the results re
ect the relationship between earnings and risk tolerance
among people who survive to late middle age, rather than among all people. Also, because I
exclude anyone with fewer than ve uncensored earnings observations, workers whose earnings
have a high mean and low variance are less likely to appear in my sample. If the high-risk-
tolerance group had higher mean earnings, this nonrandom selection could cause me to nd
more variable earnings in the high-risk-tolerance group without any true sorting on the basis
of risk. However, appendix table A.1 shows that the mean earnings of the two groups are
virtually identical.
4. Econometrics: Robust Risk-Sharing Tests
In section 2, I showed that standard risk-sharing tests are biased if risk preferences
are correlated with income processes, and in section 3, I showed that such a correlation
indeed exists. Hence, in this section, I derive tests of risk sharing that explicitly account
for the correlation of risk preferences with income processes. My tests have two goals. The
rst goal is to test the null hypothesis of full insurance while allowing risk preferences to be
heterogeneous and correlated with income processes. We can do so by estimating equation
(9) and testing the null that the income coecient g = 0. The second goal is to determine
whether risk-sharing tests that ignore heterogeneity are correctly specied. We can do so
by testing whether the heterogeneous-preferences equation (9) and the common-preferences
11equation (10) yield the same estimates of g. In particular, if we estimate (9) using a method
that nests (10) and reject the null hypothesis that the two estimates of g are equal, then we
reject the hypothesis that (10) is correctly specied.
Estimation of (10) is straightforward: The household-specic intercepts log i=
 can
be removed by a xed-eects transformation or by rst-dierencing the data; the time eects
(1=
)logt can be represented with time dummy variables; and the coecient on income
can then be estimated by ordinary least squares, or by instrumental variables if income is
measured with error. Equation (9) requires more complicated methods, however, because the
interaction between preferences 
i and aggregate shocks logt means that we cannot simply
represent aggregate shocks with dummy variables.
Two methods are known for estimating equations like (9) in samples with many house-
holds i and a few dates t. The equation can be treated as a factor model (Kiefer 1980; Lawley
and Maxwell 1963) and estimated by imposing restrictions on the variance-covariance matrix
of the measurement errors it. Alternatively, Ahn et al. (2001) propose Generalized Method
of Moments estimators for a class of equations that includes (9). The two approaches are
complementary. The factor approach imposes strong conditions on the distribution of the
errors. However, if these assumptions hold, the factor test is valid whether preferences are
correlated with income processes or not. Thus, comparing results from the factor test with
results from a common-preferences regression can show whether the common-preferences re-
gression is misspecied. If we statistically reject the hypothesis that the factor model and
common-preferences estimates are the same, then we conclude that the common-preferences
regression is misspecied. By contrast, the GMM approach makes fewer assumptions but is
valid only when preferences are heterogeneous. It is meaningless to compare a GMM estimate
of (9) with an estimate of the common preferences model (10): The estimates are guaranteed
to dier since each is valid only under assumptions that make the other invalid.
The key dierence between the factor and GMM approaches lies in how the Lagrange
multipliers logt are estimated. (Once we know the Lagrange multipliers, we can simply
include them with household-specic coecients on the right-hand side of (9).) To illustrate
how the two approaches estimate logt, assume temporarily that logi=
i and g are known
12and rewrite (9) as
uit = (1=
i)( logt) + it; (15)
where uit = logcit   logi=
i   g logXit. Let ui = (ui1;:::;uiT)0. The factor approach notes
that if the measurement error it is serially uncorrelated and homoskedastic over time for










where  =  (log1;:::;logT)0, I is the T  T identity matrix, 2
i is the variance of it for
household i, and E[] stands for the mean across households. Equation (16) can be solved
for  up to a sign and scale normalization.11 Notice that we do not need to estimate each
household's individual preferences 
i in order to solve (16) for ; preferences are nuisance
parameters that have been eliminated from the equation by taking expectations. Although
the factor method makes strong assumptions about the consumption measurement error
it, it assumes nothing about whether preferences 
i are heterogeneous. Thus, under the
maintained assumptions on it, the common preferences model is nested in the factor model; if
factor estimates of the heterogeneous-preferences model dier from estimates of the common-
preferences model, then the common-preferences model must be misspecied.
The GMM approach instead quasi-dierences (15) | along the lines of the quasi-








Again, preferences are nuisance parameters that we have eliminated from the equation. We
can estimate logt=logt 1 from the cross-sectional regression of uit on ui;t 1; again, we
can identify logt up to a sign and scale normalization. Unlike in the factor estimator, we
need not assume it is serially uncorrelated and homoskedastic. But now, because ui;t 1 is
correlated with i;t 1, we must use an instrument for ui;t 1 and estimate logt from moment
11The normalization is needed because multiplying all of the 
i's by a constant and dividing all of the logt's
by the same constant does not change the equation. The economic reason why we need a normalization is
that doubling the relative risk aversion of all households does not change the ecient allocation.











where zit is some instrumental variable orthogonal to it and i;t 1. A valid instrument exists
only if preferences are heterogeneous. To see why, recall that ui;t 1 = (1=
i)( logt 1) +
i;t 1. A valid instrument must be correlated with ui;t 1 but uncorrelated with i;t 1. Since
logt 1 does not vary in the cross section, an instrument can satisfy both requirements only
if it is cross-sectionally correlated with 
i. If preferences are identical, no variable will be
correlated with them and no valid instrument will exist. Therefore, the GMM estimator does
not nest the common-preferences model; we cannot compare GMM and common-preferences
estimates to determine whether the common-preferences model is correctly specied.
The preceding discussion abstracts from how the household-specic intercepts logi=
i
and income coecient g are estimated. In the GMM approach, the household-specic inter-
cepts are removed by rst-dierencing, and the income coecient is estimated from the same
moment conditions that are used to estimate the aggregate shocks based on (17). (Since
uit = logcit   logi=
i   g logXit, the parameter g appears implicitly in (17).) In the factor
approach, the household-specic intercepts are removed by a xed-eects transformation |
that is, by expressing income and consumption as deviations from the household's mean in-
come and consumption over time. An iterative method is then used to estimate both g and
logt: First, a value is guessed for g, and the aggregate shocks logt are estimated from (16)
based on this guess. Second, the estimated aggregate shocks are used to remove preferences

i from (9) by a quasi-xed-eects transformation that is equivalent to controlling for the
aggregate shocks with household-specic coecients, and a new value for g is then estimated
by regressing consumption on income (using instrumental variables to account for measure-
ment error in income). These two steps are iterated until the estimates for g and logt
converge. The factor approach must use xed eects rather than rst-dierencing to remove
the household-specic intercepts because rst-dierencing would violate the requirement that
the errors be serially uncorrelated.
Because the GMM method dierences the data from one year to the next while the
factor method subtracts from each variable its mean over time, the two methods perform
14dierent experiments. The GMM test analyzes how consumption responds to changes in
income from one year to the next. By contrast, the factor test analyzes how consumption
responds to deviations of income from its mean over time. Hayashi et al. (1996) note that
if insurance is imperfect but households know about income changes in advance and adjust
consumption accordingly, consumption growth is uncorrelated with contemporaneous income
growth, even though consumption will track income over longer time horizons. A test that
compares consumption at date t with its mean over time includes consumption at some long-
ago dates in the comparison and thus has a better chance of detecting the long-run changes.12
Hence, since the factor method measures the relationship between consumption and income
over longer periods than the GMM method, the factor method may detect more failures of
insurance.
In the empirical analysis, I will apply the tests to household survey data. Because
households may report income inaccurately, the tests must account for measurement error.
In fact, doing so is crucial to demonstrating that ignoring heterogeneity leads to spurious
rejections of full insurance. Suppose there is not full insurance and the true coecient on
income is positive. Classical measurement error in income will bias the estimated coecient
toward zero if the model is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). The lower the signal-to-
noise ratio, the smaller the estimated coecient. Adding controls to a regression reduces the
signal-to-noise ratio in the regressors, so adding controls for heterogeneous preferences to an
OLS risk-sharing regression will make the attenuation bias worse. In other words, if I use OLS
and reject full insurance when assuming homogeneity but not when allowing heterogeneity,
it could be either because there is full insurance but the homogeneous-preferences coecient
is biased away from zero, or because there is imperfect insurance but the heterogeneous-
preferences coecient is biased toward zero. To show that assuming homogeneity makes the
test spuriously reject full insurance, I must show that accounting for heterogeneity changes
the results even after accounting for measurement error. Therefore, in both the factor and
12As a simple example, suppose that a household is observed for four years, earning $100,000 in year 1,
$110,000 in years 2 and 3, and $120,000 in year 4. Suppose also that the household chooses to consume
$100,000 in year 1, $110,000 in year 2, and $115,000 in each of years 3 and 4, perhaps because it has advance
knowledge of what it will earn in year 4. The rst dierence of income is uncorrelated with the rst dierence
of consumption in these data, but the deviation of consumption from its mean is positively correlated with
the deviation of income from its mean.
15GMM methods, I use leisure as an instrument for income. Leisure is likely to be correlated
with income | people who work more hours will have higher income and less leisure, all
else equal | but, because leisure is a separate survey item, measurement error in leisure is
plausibly uncorrelated with measurement error in income.
One potential problem with leisure as an instrument is that if preferences are non-
separable between consumption and leisure, then leisure may aect the marginal utility of
consumption. Cochrane (1991) shows that if the planner can freely transfer leisure across
households, then nonseparability does not change the optimal allocation and thus does not
aect tests of full insurance. However, if leisure is given exogenously and cannot be trans-
ferred across households, the ecient allocation depends on leisure, implying that leisure
should be controlled for on the right-hand side of (9) and (10). In the GMM tests, I can
control for leisure while also using it as an instrument because leisure and lagged leisure can
serve as separate instruments, but only a particular linear combination of leisure and its lag
| the result of the quasi-dierencing in (17) | appears on the right-hand side; thus, I have
more instruments than regressors even after controlling for leisure. However, if I both include
leisure as a regressor and use it as an instrument, I am implicitly assuming that leisure is not
mismeasured, because a mismeasured variable cannot serve as an instrument for itself. In
the factor method, I cannot control for leisure at the same time as I use it as an instrument:
I found that the iterative procedure was numerically unstable and did not converge when I
attempted to use lagged leisure as an instrument, so I restrict myself to using contempora-
neous leisure as the instrument, but this leaves me with no extra instruments and prevents
me from controlling for leisure.
Appendix A2 gives formulas for the GMM moment conditions and the quasi-xed-
eects transformations for the factor method and states precisely the econometric assump-
tions each method uses. The appendix also shows how the tests can be extended to allow
heterogeneity in time preference by including household-specic trends in (9).
5. Interpreting Risk-Sharing Regressions under Partial Insurance
Anecdotal evidence tells us that at least some idiosyncratic shocks | for example,
winning a large lottery jackpot | are not fully insured. It is therefore interesting to go
16beyond simple tests of the null hypothesis of full insurance and investigate the magnitude
of departures from full insurance. In this section, I develop a simple model that shows how
coecients in risk-sharing regressions measure the extent of partial insurance.
The framework is identical to that of the full-insurance model in section 2, except
that transferring resources between households to provide insurance is costly. Specically,
if household i has income X and consumes c 6= X, an additional quantity ih(X;c) of the
consumption good is destroyed, where i  0. The parameter i measures how dicult it is
to insure household i. There is no household-level storage. If aggregate storage (by a social
planner) is feasible, then, as with full insurance, the model should be interpreted as describing
the optimal allocation conditional on aggregate storage.










This function is convex in the percentage dierence between consumption and income. Convex
costs will arise if several sources of insurance are available and have dierent costs; the least
costly forms of insurance will be used rst, and the marginal cost of a transfer will rise with
the magnitude of the transfer. For example, if a consumer holds a buer stock invested in
assets of varying liquidity, it will be less costly to make a small withdrawal from the most
liquid assets than to make a large withdrawal. The functional form of h also allows me to
express the costs of transfers as a percentage of consumption, and it results in an optimal
consumption allocation that takes the same form as the risk-sharing regression (9), so I can
use the partial-insurance model to interpret estimates of the risk-sharing regression.
My model of transactions costs does not correspond to any real-world institution.
However, it would be dicult to formally model all of the myriad ways that households
share risk, from insurance contracts to nancial transactions to informal gifts between friends
and relatives. I interpret the transactions costs in my model as a reduced form for all of
the institutions that households use to share risk and all of the information and incentive
problems that make these institutions less than ideal. Formally modeling only one risk-sharing
institution, such as the optimal contract under limited commitment (e.g., Ligon et al. 2002),
17would also be a reduced form because it would set aside all other institutions.
My assumption of no household-level storage is admittedly a weakness. It implies that
the cost of smoothing over time is the same as the cost of smoothing across states. Although
a model with smaller costs of smoothing over time than across states would be more realistic,
such a model would not lead to an intertemporally separable regression such as (9) or (10).
The recent literature has also proposed reduced-form imperfect-insurance models based on
the permanent income hypothesis: Some shocks are fully insured while households use bond-
holdings to self-insure against other shocks, and the relative variances of the two kinds of
shocks characterize the overall degree of insurance (Blundell et al. 2008; Heathcote et al.
2009). Although such models are attractive for many purposes, they imply that household
consumption depends on both contemporaneous and lagged variables, so they cannot be used
directly to interpret estimates of an equation such as the frequently estimated risk-sharing
regression in which consumption depends only on contemporaneous variables.
As under full insurance, it is convenient to nd the optimal allocation in the model
with costly transfers via a social planner's problem. The planner's objective function (5) is
the same as before, but the planner now faces the constraint that, for each date and state,










ih[Xit(st);cit(st)] 8 t;st: (19)










































For i log(cit=Xit) close to zero | that is, when the resources lost to imperfect risk sharing













logXit + it: (22)
Equation (22) says income has a larger eect on the consumption of households that are less
risk averse (small 
i) or more dicult to insure (large i).13 As insurance costs go to zero,
income does not aect consumption at all, while as insurance costs go to innity, consumption
moves one-for-one with income.
Let g denote the mean eect of income on consumption: g  E[i=(i +
i)]. Then we









( logt) + g logXit + ~ it;








which is the same risk-sharing regression proposed in (9), but with a dierent error term. The
estimated income coecient in risk-sharing regressions such as (9) and (10) thus measures
the average relative costs and benets of risk sharing. However, just as with full insur-
ance, omitted-variable bias will distort the estimate of g if preferences are heterogeneous but
we estimate the common-preferences equation (10) instead of the heterogeneous-preferences
equation (9). Since the bias in the estimate of g is likely upward, estimates of (10) may lead
us to conclude that insurance is worse than it actually is.
Section 4 derived methods for testing the null hypothesis of full insurance based on
testing whether g = 0 in (9). Because the methods generate estimates of g, I can also use
them to measure the extent of partial insurance if I reject full insurance. The only dierence
between the forms of (9) and (23) is that the error term in (23) potentially contains a random
coecient on income. For simplicity, I assume here that the coecient on income is common
across households | that is, I assume i=(i +
i) = g for all i | so that there is no random
13One can derive the same equation in levels without any approximation by assuming constant absolute risk
aversion preferences, h(X;c) = (c X)2=2, and additive measurement error, but the nonnegativity constraint
on measured consumption makes additive errors statistically unattractive.









( logt) + g logXit + it; (24)
which is identical to (9) except that the intercept and aggregate shock terms have been
multiplied by 1   g. Rescaling these terms does not change the assumptions required to
estimate the equation; thus, given i=(i+
i) = g, the methods I use for (9) remain valid for
(23). In Schulhofer-Wohl (2007), I show that the estimators also remain valid if the covariance
between the instrument (leisure) and income does not depend on i=(i + 
i).
Estimates of the partial insurance model require one important caveat. The dierenc-
ing operators used to remove household xed eects could amplify any biases from the linear
approximation that turns (21) into (22). Because dierent numbers and kinds of dierenc-
ing operators are used to estimate the models with and without heterogeneity, dierences in
estimates that do and do not allow heterogeneity may re
ect dierences in the approxima-
tion bias rather than the omitted variable bias from heterogeneity. Estimates of the partial
insurance model therefore need to be interpreted with more caution than tests of the null
hypothesis of full insurance.
6. Robust Risk-Sharing Regressions: Results
This section estimates the eects of idiosyncratic income 
uctuations on consumption
in equations (9) and (10). I analyze data on consumption, income, and leisure from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The PSID is among the only panels long enough to
permit estimation of a model with multiple household-specic parameters. However, the PSID
measures only food consumption.14 While food is not an ideal proxy for total consumption,
it may be more likely to be time separable, as the expected utility formulation assumes.
I use data from the 1974 to 1997 waves of the PSID | a period over which the
denitions of food and income variables remained roughly constant | but drop 1988 and
14The Consumer Expenditure Survey, which measures more consumption than the PSID, contains only two
observations on income per household | too short a panel for my purposes. I choose not to follow Blundell
et al. (2005) in imputing total consumption in the PSID by inverting a food demand equation because that
approach would assume that heterogeneity in preferences depends only on observables, contrary to the premise
of this paper that unobservable heterogeneity is important.
201989, when no food consumption data were collected. I dene income as the household's total
money income except for Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Supplemental Security
Income, other welfare payments, unemployment insurance, worker's compensation, and help
from relatives, all of which represent insurance rather than shocks that should be insured. I
convert income data to real terms using the Consumer Price Index and food data using the
food and beverages component of the CPI. I measure leisure by 8,760 (the number of hours in
a year) minus hours worked by the head of household.15 I restrict the sample to households
with consumption, income, and leisure data in at least four consecutive years, the minimum
number of observations required for the GMM estimators. Appendix A1 describes the data
in detail.
Theory describes the optimal allocation of consumption to well-dened households
with xed utility functions. In reality, households change constantly as people are born, die,
marry, divorce, and so on. Because these events could change preferences, I create a new
household when any household members change. I also put consumption and income in per
capita terms by dividing by the number of adult equivalent household members, though this
has little eect since the list of household members is constant; the only change over time is
in their ages. The Web appendix shows that the dierences between tests with and without
preference heterogeneity are similar if I use total consumption and income data instead of
per capita data, or if I create a new household only when the head or spouse changes.
Because new households can form from old ones, observations on dierent households
may not be independent. In addition, the PSID uses a clustered sampling design. I adjust all
bootstrap condence intervals and two-step ecient GMM procedures to account for arbitrary
correlation in the error terms across households and over time within each of the 119 original
PSID primary sampling units.16
15The Web appendix shows that the parameter estimates do not change substantially when I dene leisure
to include the spouse's leisure for couple-headed households.
16For bootstrap procedures, I draw primary sampling units from the original sample with replacement. I
construct equal-tailed condence intervals, which account for possible bias and asymmetry in the estimator's
nite-sample distribution (Horowitz 2001). For two-step ecient GMM, consider estimating a parameter
vector  based on the moment conditions E[g(xi;)] = 0. Let j index groups of households. An ecient




i2j g(xi; ^ )    g
 P
i2j g(xi; ^ )    g
0
=N] 1,
where ^  is a rst-step consistent estimator and  g =
P
i g(xi; ^ )=N.
21A. Threats to identication
Many previous researchers have identied ways in which either (1) income is correlated
with consumption under full insurance or (2) income is uncorrelated with consumption even
though insurance is incomplete or nonexistent. The rst problem biases the income coecient
in a risk-sharing regression away from zero; the second biases the coecient toward zero. I
cannot solve most of the well-known problems here, but I review them as a reminder of
important caveats to my results.
Observed income will be correlated with observed consumption if productivity at work
is correlated with preference shocks, if consumption and leisure are nonseparable but leisure
is omitted, if measurement errors in consumption and income are correlated, or if income
includes insurance payments. None of these correlations necessarily re
ects a failure of full
insurance. My GMM estimates include leisure on the right-hand side of the consumption
equation to account for nonseparable preferences. I try to remove insurance payments from
income by subtracting welfare and other transfer payments.
Many factors can cause observed income and consumption to be uncorrelated even
when insurance is imperfect. For example, because I create a new household when any
household member changes, my regressions say nothing about insurance against divorce or
death. In addition, a test of risk sharing using data on food consumption lacks power against
the alternative that consumption of other goods is not well insured. More generally, what-
ever consumption variable a researcher studies may not be the consumption that households
care about. Even given data on consumption of many goods besides food, one would face
dicult questions of how to treat durable goods, home production, and the like. Classical
measurement error in income will also bias the estimated income coecient toward zero; as
I discuss in section 4, I use instrumental variables to remove this attenuation bias.
B. Factor estimates
Table 2 shows factor estimates of the coecient on income for the common-preferences
model (10) and for versions of the heterogeneous-preferences model (9) that allow hetero-
geneity in time preference, risk preference, or both. Leisure is assumed to be separable from
consumption and is used as an instrument for income.
22In column 1 of the table, when I assume households have identical preferences, a 1
percent increase in income raises food consumption by 0.161 percent, holding aggregate shocks
constant. In the remaining columns, allowing variation in preferences reduces the elasticity by
a factor of 20 to 40 percent, to between 0.092 and 0.129. Since food is a necessity and has an
income elasticity below unity, the coecients should be adjusted upward to nd an estimated
elasticity of total consumption to idiosyncratic income shocks. Blundell et al. (2005) estimate
that the elasticity of total consumption to food consumption is 1=0:88 = 1:14 in U.S. data.
In the models that allow heterogeneity in time preference or in both risk and time
preference | columns 3 and 4 | I reject at the 5 percent level the hypothesis that the
coecients are equal in models with and without heterogeneity. Because the heterogeneous-
preferences estimator is consistent under weaker assumptions than the common-preferences
estimator, I therefore reject the hypothesis that the common-preferences estimator is correctly
specied. But even with the heterogeneous-preferences estimates, I reject the null hypothesis
of full insurance.
C. GMM estimates
Table 3 shows two-step ecient Generalized Method of Moments estimates of the eect
of income on consumption. Leisure is used as an instrument and, in some specications,
included on the right-hand side of the regression to account for nonseparability between
consumption and leisure. The overidentifying restrictions are never rejected.
The even-numbered columns of the table allow nonseparability between consumption
and leisure, while the odd-numbered columns assume separability. The estimates show that
allowing nonseparability always reduces the coecient on income.17 Since allowing nonsepa-
rability is a key advantage of the GMM approach, I focus on the estimates that allow non-
separability. These estimates show that the elasticity of consumption with respect to income
is 0.234 under common preferences (column 2) but falls to between -0.086 and 0.123 when I
allow preference heterogeneity (columns 4, 6, and 8). The coecient on income is never sta-
tistically signicantly dierent from zero when I allow for heterogeneity and nonseparability.
The GMM results thus show that, when I allow for heterogeneity and nonseparability, the
17However, the Web appendix shows that under alternative denitions of consumption and household
membership, there is no clear pattern in the eect of allowing nonseparability.
23data do not reject the hypothesis of full insurance.
D. Discussion
The factor model estimates and GMM estimates both show that allowing heterogeneity
tends to reduce the estimated eect of income on consumption, but the magnitudes of the
estimated coecients dier substantially between the factor and GMM specications. The
dierence is not surprising, since the factor model and the GMM moment conditions rely
on dierent assumptions. The factor model may detect more failures of insurance because it
looks at variation in consumption and income over a longer time span. The factor estimates
also require consumption and leisure to be separable, while the GMM specications allow
nonseparability if leisure is included as a regressor. However, the GMM estimates that allow
nonseparability also require that leisure be measured without error.
The GMM estimates also potentially suer from a weak instruments problem. The
problem is especially severe in the case of estimates that allow heterogeneous risk preferences,
because in these specications the aggregate shocks are identied only from the correlation
between preferences and income processes, a correlation that need not be strong. Finite
sample bias due to weak instruments potentially explains the very large coecients on income
in some of the GMM specications that allow heterogeneity only in risk preferences.
The eect of income on consumption diers statistically from zero in the factor model
estimates, suggesting that insurance may be imperfect. However, the GMM estimates are not
signicantly dierent from zero, and the coecients are small; the imperfection, if any, is not
large. In the factor model estimates, a 1 percent increase in a household's income, holding
aggregate resources constant, raises the household's food consumption by 0.092 percent once
we allow heterogeneity in risk and time preferences. By comparison, Blundell et al. (2005)
estimate that the cross-sectional elasticity of food spending to total nondurable spending is
0.88 in U.S. data. In other words, the response of consumption to income changes is less than
one-ninth of what it would be in the absence of all consumption smoothing.
The partial-insurance model of section 5 provides another way to interpret the esti-
mated income coecient. Recall that, in the model, the elasticity of income to consumption
is E[i=(i+
i)], the ratio of insurance costs to insurance costs plus risk aversion. Suppose for
24simplicity that i=
i = k for all households i and that the average household has log utility.
After adjusting the estimated 0.092 elasticity of food consumption to income upward based
on the Blundell et al. (2005) results, my estimates imply that it would cost a household with
log utility about 0.10 percent of consumption to have a hypothetical 10 percent dierence
between consumption and income. The cost would be nearly twice as high | 0.18 percent of
consumption | if one used the coecient estimated assuming common preferences.
One can also compare my results to two papers that test risk sharing with PSID
data and assume income processes are uncorrelated with risk preferences. Cochrane (1991)
regresses consumption growth on income growth and nds an elasticity of 0.1 to 0.2. He
does not use instrumental variables, so the coecient is biased toward zero if income is
measured with error; IV estimates would likely be larger. Dynarski and Gruber (1997) also
regress consumption growth on income growth, but they use instrumental variables and allow
variation in time preferences (although not risk preferences); they nd an elasticity of 0.205.
Both papers omit leisure from the right-hand side, thus assuming either that consumption and
leisure are separable or that the social planner can freely transfer leisure across households.
7. Conclusion
Under full insurance, consumption does not depend at all on income after holding
aggregate shocks constant. Under imperfect insurance, the eect of income on consumption
shows the relative costs and benets of risk sharing. This paper highlights the importance
of accounting carefully for preferences when measuring how income aects consumption. If
households have dierent risk preferences and if income processes are correlated with pref-
erences, a risk-sharing regression that assumes identical preferences will nd too large an
eect of idiosyncratic income shocks on consumption. Empirical results conrm the bias.
First, income processes are correlated with preferences: In the HRS, earnings are more corre-
lated with aggregate shocks among workers with greater risk tolerance. Second, in the PSID,
allowing heterogeneity substantially reduces the estimated eect of income on consumption.
The results suggest several directions for further research. The HRS data suggest that
people may choose jobs in part on the basis of risk preferences. Sorting on the basis of risk
preference means not sorting purely on the basis of productivity; if risk were eliminated or
25insurance were better, people might sort dierently and output might rise.18 The welfare
gain from changes in sorting could be calculated by estimating the relationship between
preferences, productivity in various occupations, and the time-series properties of individual
income. Also, although I have demonstrated that more-risk-averse people bear less aggregate
risk, I have not tested whether aggregate risk is allocated in precisely the shares required for
Pareto eciency. Finally, I study a static model of imperfect risk sharing. The relationship
between preferences, income processes, and incomplete insurance could also fruitfully be
investigated in a dynamic context.
18See Heathcote et al. (2008) for a related analysis of the eects of insurance on aggregate output when














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Table 2: Factor model estimates of the eect of income on consump-
tion after controlling for aggregate shocks.
log(consumption per adult equivalent)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(income) 0.161 0.129 0.105 0.092
95% CI (0.119, (0.073, (0.056, (0.005,
0.193) 0.184) 0.144) 0.115)
95% CI for di. - (-0.067, (-0.082, (-0.129,
from common prefs. 0.010) -0.028) -0.033)
Heterogeneity:
risk aversion no yes no yes
time preference no no yes yes
Equal-tailed 95% condence intervals are computed using 79 boot-
strap samples. To allow for correlation across households and over
time within each of the 119 PSID primary sampling units, the boot-
strap samples are constructed by drawing PSUs with replacement
from the original sample.
28Table 3: GMM estimates of the eect of income on consumption after controlling for aggregate
shocks.
log(consumption per adult equivalent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(income) 0.283 0.234 -0.001 -0.013 0.345 0.123 0.053 -0.086
(0.023) (0.041) (0.026) (0.055) (0.047) (0.076) (0.029) (0.068)
log(leisure) - -0.104 - -0.079 - 0.083 - -0.165
(0.005) (0.006) (0.014) (0.007)
Test of overidentifying restrictions:
2 26.1 37.5 27.4 35.4 35.6 29.0 37.6 30.3
d.f. 31 30 31 30 31 30 31 30
p 0.716 0.162 0.652 0.228 0.259 0.516 0.192 0.449
Heterogeneity:
risk aversion no no no no yes yes yes yes
time preference no no yes yes no no yes yes
Standard errors (in parentheses) and test statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and to
correlation across households and over time within each of the 119 PSID primary sampling
units.
29Appendix
A1. Summary statistics for the HRS and PSID samples
Table A.1 summarizes the earnings data from the HRS.
Table A.2 summarizes the consumption, income, and leisure data from the PSID. I use
the PSID core sample, which began with 3,000 households chosen randomly from the U.S.
population in 1968. I examine these variables:
Income: family money income | the sum of labor earnings, capital income, and trans-
fer payments received by all household members | minus Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, Supplemental Security Income, other welfare payments, unemployment insurance,
worker's compensation, and help from relatives.
Leisure: 8,760 hours (the number of hours in a year) minus the number of hours that
the head reported working.
Food consumption: the sum of annual expenditure on food eaten at home; annual
expenditure on food eaten away from home, except at work and school; and annual value of
food stamps received.
Adult equivalent household members: The PSID denes a food standard for each house-
hold that accounts for economies of scale as well as dierences in food needs by age and sex.
I divide income and consumption by the food standard to obtain data per adult equivalent
household member. Table A.3 shows the equivalence scale.
Price indexes: I de
ate the income data using the Consumer Price Index and the food
consumption data using the food and beverages component of the CPI.
Dates: PSID questions on income and leisure refer to the previous calendar year. For
example, questions in the 1968 survey asked about income and leisure during 1967. The time
period covered by the food questions is not specied in the survey, and it is unclear what
time period respondents have in mind when they respond. Following the literature, I assume
that the food data also refer to the previous year.
Household structure: When the head or spouse changes, it is unclear when during
the year the change took place. I therefore use only observations for which the household
had the same head and spouse in the previous year as in the current year. I determine
30household membership by matching individual ID numbers in the PSID individual data le
to households in the PSID family data le.
Sample selection: I drop an observation if the PSID 
ags any of the three food variables
as a major or minor assignment (i.e., imputed value). This eliminates less than 1 percent of
the observations.
31Table A.1: Summary statistics by risk tolerance for Health and Retirement
Study earnings samples.
Low risk tol. High risk tol.
Variable mean s.d. mean s.d.
Variables that are constant for each worker
Years of education 12.1 3.2 12.8 3.4




Observations on worker 28.6 6.8 27.7 7.0
Uncensored observations on worker 20.4 7.4 19.5 7.1
Variables that change over time
Experience (age-education-6) 21.0 10.3 19.9 10.2
Annual earningsa 19275 12136 19778 13119
Log(annual earnings)a 9.61 0.91 9.61 0.96
Number of men 2,528 1,562
Number of observations 72,201 43,223
Men in Health and Retirement Study with at least ve uncensored earnings
observations from age 23 to 61. aSocial Security earnings through 1979; from
1980, W-2 earnings censored at $120,000 in nominal terms. De
ated by CPI;
1982{1984 dollars.
32Table A.2: Summary statistics for PSID consumption and income sample.
Variable mean s.d.
annual food consumptiona 3840 2271
adult equivalent food consumptiona,b 2200 1206
log(adult equivalent food consumption)a,b 7.58 0.49
annual income net of transfersc 32053 33103
adult equivalent annual income net of transfersb,c 18357 19695
log(adult equivalent annual income net of transfers)b,c 9.52 0.90
head's annual hours not at work 7150 1092
log(head's annual hours not at work) 8.86 0.15
Observations 42,740
Households 5,489







PSID core sample households with data on head's work hours, family money income,
and food consumption in at least four consecutive years. aDe
ated by food and bever-
ages component of CPI; 1982{1984 dollars. bSee equivalence scale in table A.3; scaled
so adjustment factor is 1 for a man age 21 to 35 living alone. cDe
ated by CPI.
Table A.3: PSID adult equivalence scale.
Age Male Female Family size Adjustment
 3 3.9 3.9 1 +20%
4-6 4.6 4.6 2 +10%
7-9 5.5 5.5 3 +5%
10-12 6.4 6.3 4 none
13-15 7.4 6.9 5 -5%
16-20 8.7 7.2  6 -10%
21-35 7.5 6.5
35-55 6.9 6.3
 56 6.3 5.4
Source: PSID; U.S. Department of Agriculture formula.
33A2. Details of econometric methods
This section gives details of my methods for estimating (9). To keep the notation
simple, I consider here a balanced panel of data on N households in T years. Schulhofer-
Wohl (2007) shows that the methods remain valid when the panel is unbalanced, as long as
missing data are missing at random. Let yit = logcit, xit = logXit, zit = log(leisureit), and
dt =  logt. I consider the case where both risk and time preferences are heterogeneous, so













+ gxit + it: (A2.1)
For any variable it, let i = [i1;:::;iT]0 denote the column vector of observations on it for
household i. Let  be a column vector of ones. I assume that T  4, that each household is
observed at least three times, and that some households are observed four times.19
A2.1. Factor model test
I adopt several assumptions that are standard in instrumental variables applications.
Assumption F.1. E[xisit] = E[(1=
i)it] = E[(logi=
i)it] = E[it] = 0 for all i;s;t.
Assumption F.2. Instead of observing actual log income, xit, we observe x




Assumption F.1 says measurement error in consumption is uncorrelated with income and
preferences. Assumption F.2 says log income is measured with additive error. Assumption
F.3 says leisure is uncorrelated with measurement error in consumption and income.
I also assume measurement error in both consumption and income is serially uncorre-





i I for all i.
19Given only three time periods, we could t the data perfectly with any g, 0 > 0, 1 > 0, and 2 > 0 by
choosing i, 
i, and i to solve (A2.1) for t = 0;1;2.
20We cannot test this assumption in an unbalanced panel unless we assume the pattern of missing data is
uncorrelated with the household-specic variance of measurement error.
34Let I be the T  T identity matrix and M = I  0
T . If we multiply any vector by M,
we obtain the residuals from regressing that vector on a constant | in other words, we use
xed eects to remove household-specic means. Similarly, for any T  1 vector ~ d, dene




If we multiply any vector by V(~ d), we obtain the residuals from regressing that vector on a
trend and ~ dt. That is, multiplying by V(~ d) uses a quasi-xed-eects transformation to remove
household-specic trends and, if ~ d = d, household-specic eects of aggregate shocks.
I require a version of the usual rank condition for instrumental variables:
Assumption F.5. E[z0
iMV(~ d)Mxi] 6= 0 for all ~ d in a neighborhood of d.
Assumption F.5 says that the instrument is correlated with income after controlling for ag-
gregate shocks, not only for the true aggregate shocks but also for incorrect aggregate shocks
in the neighborhood of the true shocks.
A useful result (Lawley and Maxwell 1963, chap. 2) is that the solution to (16) is the











My estimator of (d;g) is the pair (~ d; ~ g) that simultaneously solves the following equations:






(yi   ~ gx

i)














t = 1; d1 > 0: (A2.4)









Equation (A2.4) uses the least squares procedure (A2.3) to estimate d, taking as
given some value ~ g for the coecient on income. If ~ g = g, the measurement error in x
it
35simply increases the variance of the residuals, and (A2.3) will continue to provide a consistent
estimator of d under assumption F.4. Hence, ~ d(~ g) will be consistent for d if ~ g is a consistent
estimator of g. The normalization in (A2.4) is required because, for any nonzero constants
k1, k2, and k3, we can replace dt with k1dt +k2t+k3, 
i with k1
i, logi with logi  k2=k1,
and logi with logi   k3=k1 without changing the model.
Equation (A2.5) uses zit as an instrument for x
it to estimate the income coecient
g. If ~ d = d, then multiplying by V (d) and M removes the household-specic intercepts,




i on xit using zit as an instrument; assumptions F.1, F.2, F.3, and F.5
guarantee that zit is a valid instrument. Thus, ~ g(~ d) will be consistent for g if ~ d is a consistent
estimator of d. It follows that, if (A2.4) and (A2.5) together have a unique solution, this
solution is a consistent estimator of (g;d). I iterate on (A2.4) and (A2.5) to nd a pair (~ d; ~ g)
that solves the two equations.21 The estimator can be adapted to allow heterogeneity only
in risk preference or only in time preference by omitting t or d, respectively, from the V
matrix. Interpreting the estimator as just-identied GMM applied to (A2.5) and the rst-
order conditions of (A2.4) shows that the estimator is root-N consistent and asymptotically
normal.22
A2.2. GMM tests
The GMM tests allow nonseparability between consumption and leisure, so the equa-













+ fzit + gxit + it: (A2.6)
The tests use both long and short time dierences of variables. To write these dierences
concisely, for any , dene sit = it   i;t s and 2
sit = (it   i;t 1)   (i;t s   i;t s 1).
The tests are based on the following moment condition:
21In my data, the iteration always converges in 10 or fewer steps. I investigate whether the xed point is
unique by starting the iteration from several places and examining whether all give the same result.
22The model cannot be estimated by GMM because the moment conditions may not have a unique solution.
In practice, I construct standard errors and condence intervals for the parameters by bootstrapping.
36Assumption G.1. For all s and t,
E[ziseit] = 0; (A2.7)
where eit represents the error term in (9) or (10) depending on which equation is estimated.
I consider only a subset of the moment conditions that (A2.7) could generate. Long
leads and lags of leisure are likely to be weak instruments, and not all leads and lags are
available for any given observation in an unbalanced panel. I therefore use a small set of
relatively strong instruments: leisure and its rst lag. Let hit denote the vector of instruments
[1 zit zi;t 1]0.
No heterogeneity: Suppose risk and time preferences are identical across households,
so we can normalize 
i = 1 and logi = 0 for all i. If we dierence (A2.6) to eliminate the
household-specic intercept, we obtain
3yit = 3dt + f3zit + g3xit + 3it:
If leisure and its rst lag are uncorrelated with it, the following moment conditions hold:
E[hit(3yit   3dt   f3zit   g3xit)] = 0; t = 4;:::;T: (A2.8)
To test for full insurance while assuming all households have the same risk and time prefer-
ences, I test whether the estimate of g based on (A2.8) is zero.
Heterogeneity only in time preference: The right-hand side of (A2.6) now includes a

























= 0; t = 4;:::;T: (A2.9)
37A test for whether g = 0 using these moment conditions is a valid test for full insurance
under assumption G.1 and the maintained hypothesis that households have identical risk
preferences, whether time preferences vary or not.
Heterogeneity only in risk preference: If households have the same rate of time pref-





2dt + f2zit + g2xit + 2eit: (A2.10)
Equation (A2.10) is equivalent to the model studied by Ahn et al. (2001):23 ~ yit = bi ~ dt+~ x0
it+






















which does not contain the household-specic risk preference parameter 
i. Then the following

























5 = 0: (A2.11)
A test for whether g = 0 using moment conditions (A2.11) is a valid test for full insurance
under assumption G.1 and the maintained hypothesis that all households have the same time
preferences, whether risk preferences vary or not.
Heterogeneity in risk and time preference: Second dierences of (A2.6) can be quasi-
dierenced to produce moment conditions valid when both risk and time preferences vary:





































5 = 0: (A2.12)
23Indeed, Ahn et al. (2001) mention risk-sharing tests as a possible application of their model.
38Under assumption G.1, a test for whether g = 0 using moment conditions (A2.12) is a valid
test for full insurance regardless of variation in risk or time preferences.
Identication in all four sets of moment conditions requires that the instruments be
correlated with the right-hand-side variables. Ahn et al. (2001) show that identication
in (A2.11) and (A2.12) also requires that an instrument be correlated with 
i, which in
turn implies risk preferences must be heterogeneous. Section 4 provides intuition for this
requirement.
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